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INTRODUCTION
The core of Nishitani studies in Japan has formed around his two-volume Collected Essays on Religion. The first volume, completed by the author at age sixty-one, called What is Religion? (ShQkyd to wa nanika; 1961), a trans­
lation of which appeared serially in the pages o f this journal, is better known 
in the West under its adapted title, Religion and Nothingness, trans. Jan Van 
Bragt (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1982). The second volume, 
called The Standpoint o f  Zen (Zen no tachiba), came out in 1986, and con­
tained three separate monographs: “The Standpoint o f Zen” (Zen no tachiba), 
“ Issues in the Study o f Zen” (Zen ni okeru shomondai) and “ (Zen) Poems” 
(Shige).
In fact, the three essays that comprise The Standpoint o f  Zen were first pub­
lished shortly after Religion and Nothingness, in the period from 1967 to 
1969. “The Standpoint o f Zen” (1967) appeared in the first volume o f the 
eight-volume Zen Lectures (KOza Zen) series, edited by Nishitani Keiji and su­
pervised by D. T. Suzuki, now unfortunately out o f print. A translation o f 
this seminal essay was published by John C. Maraldo in the Eastern Buddhist 
17-1 (1984), under the title “ The Standpoint of Zen.” The piece below, “The 
Problem of Anjin  in Zen” (1968), is the translation o f the first half o f the sec­
ond essay, entitled Zen ni okeru anjin no mondai in the original and published 
in volume eight o f the Zen Lectures series. It is hoped that the triad will be 
completed eventually with a translation o f the third and final essay, “ Dharma 
and Person in Zen” (Zen ni okeru ho to nin, 1969), originally published in 
Zen Essence and Human Truth (Zen no honshitsu to ningen no shinri), edited 
by Hisamatsu Shin’ichi and Nishitani Keiji. The three essays in The Stand­
point o f  Zen have since been compiled in volume eleven o f Nishitani’s Col­
lected Works.
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In the epilogue to The Standpoint o f  Zen (1986), Nishitani explains how this 
work expresses his view o f the Zen tradition and Western philosophy, stating 
that he felt he had clarified his standpoint o f *4 religious and philosophical con­
sideration?’ As with the first volume, Religion and Nothingness, the critical 
outlook in this essay is the result o f a long process o f thought: “ My reasoning 
is based on the fact that it has become possible for me to philosophically inves­
tigate the standpoint o f Zen.” Nishitani defines “ the standpoint o f Zen” as 
one “ which I have taken as the path to the philosophical self-awareness o f 
one’s own self.” It is this investigation o f the self that Nishitani broaches in 
the first essay, “The Standpoint o f Zen,” and which he rigorously engages in 
the thoughts that follow.
2
The Problem of Anjin in Zen
I
NISHITANI KEIJI
I
THE FACT that as humans we seek to illuminate the self while living in the real world is the result o f an awareness o f a deep anxiety re* 
garding the selfs existence in the world. The types o f anxiety which 
manifest within both the individual and society lead to various efforts 
to erase this problem from within the indvidual or from society, but it 
matters little because such profound anxiety cannot be removed by any 
form of labor in the usual sense of the word. When this state of in­
security appears from the very bottom of these multifaceted phenome­
na of uncertainty, when one realizes that the depth of this anxiety re­
veals it to be coiled around our very existence in this world, it is then 
that in searching for a solution one takes the first step into the realm of 
religion and philosophy. Because it arises from the depth of our exis­
tence and brings with it the problematic of existence itself, which 
manifests itself from within that anxiety, it is useless to seek a genuine
• This is the first of a two-part translation of “ Zen ni okeru anjin no mondai” 
(1968), in Nishitani Keiji chosaku-shQ [Collected Works] 11:32-84; the present install­
ment comprises pp. 32-61. It was originally published in the eight-volume Kdza Zen 
series edited by Nishitani Keiji, and later republished along with other essays in Zen no 
tachiba (1986). The second part o f  this essay will appear in a future issue of the jour­
nal. We wish to thank John C. Maraldo for his editorial assistance on technical por­
tions. Footnotes are the author’s, as presented in the original Kdza Zen volume; the 
endnotes are those provided by the translator.
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solution to this problem anywhere outside religion and philosophy.
In Zen such searching is called “ investigating the matter of se lf’ (ko- 
j i  kytlmei and is presented as an intense focus on returning
the self to within the self itself. In this way light is reflected back onto 
the original self by means of the self itself; it is directed to dig up the 
ground upon which one’s own existence stands.
Investigating the matter of self thus means a thoroughgoing probe 
into the very ground where our self-existence is established. But at the 
same time it is a search for the only possible point of origin for the fun­
damental conquest of the multiform anxieties of the world. It is there 
that one finds dynamic recognition of the fact that stopping halfway 
means that whatever solution one achieves is also an inevitable cause 
for the outbreak of new anxiety. This problematic is referred to in Zen 
as the search for anjin—“ assurance” or “ pacified mind.” ff
The search for anjin is a search for certainty regarding [the nature 
of] the existence of the self. The word anjin is frequently used in a 
religious sense to express the resolution of anxiety, but it contains a 
philosophical meaning as well. The philosophical and intellectual side 
of anjin means to dispel any doubt about the existence of the self itself. 
However, in order to fundamentally remove all of one’s genuine 
doubts, one must first clarify the origins of the uncertain nature of exis­
tence. And those origins lie hidden within the roots of the very fact of 
one’s own existence within the world. The uncertainty of self-existence 
originates in the very fact that, at its base, self-existence is rooted ex­
actly where the world itself has its base. All existence changes, all life in­
evitably must die; the existence of human life is also a matter of birth 
and death. This fact speaks of the uncertainty of existence itself—an 
uncertainty rooted in the fundamental nature of the world itself. And 
while everything else may exist in the world without ever awakening to 
this indefiniteness, human beings have this insecurity about them that 
demands they inevitably carry their doubts with them wherever they 
go.
Humans are conscious and self-conscious beings; they exist in the 
world in such a way the world and themselves are knowable. It is inevi­
table in the human condition that one senses anxiety and doubt regard­
ing one’s own existence. This anxiety and doubt spring from the very 
foundation of the world in which the anxiety of existence is rooted and 
accordingly also emerge from the foundation of one’s own existence. It
4
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is this mental foundation which is thoroughly discussed in Mahayana 
Buddhism as the Alaya-vijhana,6  the locale where the world and the 
conscious and self-conscious mind are one.1
As in all religion, Buddhism is trying to extricate a self shackled by 
the world from a state of uncertainty. It seeks to remove oneself from 
the world and this separation is none other than breaking through the 
dark prison of the Alaya consciousness. In Zen the method used for 
this breakthrough is to dig up the roots of an existential doubt which 
arises from within one’s own mind. This takes the form of a tenacious 
penetration of doubt. And in this exhausting of doubt, the Alaya con­
sciousness becomes manifest to the self from the very ground of one’s 
own mind. In this way, doubt changes into a foundational doubt which 
conjoins the world and the self into one primal doubt: each is trans­
formed and fused into the so-called Great Doubt/ Within that Great 
Doubt, the Alaya consciousness becomes manifest to the self as yet 
another Great Doubt.
In the investigation of the matter of self, this transparency of the 
Alaya-vijfifina is transformed from the Great Doubt into something 
which manifests the so-called Great Death. The Great Death is a death 
in which the world and the self die together as one. In olden days, peo­
ple referred to this as “ cutting off the roots of sarpsara.” SamsOra 
means rebirth, the cycle of being bom again and dying again in a con­
tinuous round of anxiety and uncertainty without end. This sense of 
infinitude is represented in the concept of duhkha as an infinite aspect 
of the experiences of birth, aging, disease and death.
In the situation in which we find ourselves in the world, the unlimit­
ed nature of duhmkha must be recognized; that is, the anxiety and un­
certainty that surround existence itself contain an element of infinity. 
This is an actual fact of sarpsaric existence and the origin of this fact 
lies in the Alaya-vijh&nay where our existence is rooted. The root of 
this saijisdra filled with this dimension of infinity is the Alaya-vijriana.
From this point of view, what we normally call death is limited to the 
dissolution of a mind and body that were only temporary to begin 
with; a death of one component within the endless stream of birth and 
death and birth and death. This conventional sense of death does not 
constitute a liberation from sarnsOra; it is not the longed-for complete
1 See my essay, “ Zen no tachiba” in the first volume of this KOza Zen series.
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casting off of body and mind from all reincarnations. Thus, death in 
the usual sense is not a genuine extrication from anxiety and uncertain­
ty. This is why suicide is not a solution [to spiritual problems]. Death 
in the truest sense of the word can only be a death from the ground of 
sarpsQra itself. It must be a death that happens where there is a union 
of the ground of saipsaric existence and the ground of the world. This 
is precisely digging up the roots of a sarnsdra rooted in the Alaya- 
vijnana, and then cutting them off. Understood in this sense, the Great 
Death is a death that is existentially transcendent, and it is this death 
that is the real escape from the world and the self entrapped within it, 
existentially liberating the self.
The standpoint of Zen is expressed in ways that reflect a completely 
normal state of affairs as well as a total self-negation. These are the two 
sides of anjin attained in the investigation of self. We could call these 
two faces of anjin absolute affirmation and absolute negation. Thus 
in addition to anjin signifying absolute affirmation it also incorporates 
an aspect of absolute negation represented by the Great Death—dying 
to the self and to the world. In other words, it is these two aspects 
together that express a fundamental transformation in human exis­
tence.
In the realm of religion and philosophy where this transformation is 
made an issue, however, we generally find that the motive force behind 
the transformation in the sense of death described here, as well as the 
subsequent resurrection, is in some way ascribed to an absolute existent 
(i.e., God or Buddha). It is thought that only something eternal can en­
able humans to truly overcome death and make them into new persons 
who are reborn in life without falling into the realm of birth and de­
struction. And there is sufficient reason for this attitude. In the first 
place, the problems of death and its conquest are most basic to every­
one. Normally it is thought that for the self with all its entanglements 
in the world, it is the threshold of death that is the limit of the self, the 
last possibility for the self. In commonsense terms the death of the self 
is considered simply a “ natural” destruction and while its inevitability 
is explained as a biological phenomenon accepted as coming at some 
unknown time, for many living in the present, death is avoided by push­
ing it aside to the indefinite future.
Philosophically this is brought back into one’s actual present exis­
tence, and from the limited nature of that existence in which nonexis-
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tence is also somehow mixed in, it is interpreted as an ontological issue. 
Religiously speaking, however, problems of the inevitability of death 
or the rationale for death can only be clarified existentially through 
one’s personal burden of fate. And it is through this clarification 
(which Kierkegaard called the “ infinite resignation” ) that one takes 
responsibility for this issue upon oneself. In such a decision, the death 
which is the death of the world together with the death of the mortal 
self can be turned into a death of dying while living. But such a death 
only becomes a complete death when one throws the self into the abso­
lute eternal other, such as God or Buddha, who is manifest on the 
other side of that death line. Another way of saying this is that, at the 
moment when one entrusts oneself to that power of God or Buddha 
which draws people in, the self is obliterated and one is embraced by 
God or Buddha. Moreover, at that moment the obliterated self is 
brought to life by the power of that embrace and is reborn: thus death 
for the self immediately becomes rebirth.
This expresses, more or less, the religious viewpoint on death and 
how it can be overcome. We may borrow Ddgen’s famous words/ 
“ When you simply release and forget both your body and your mind 
and throw yourself into the house of Buddha, and when functioning 
comes from the direction of Buddha and you go in accord with it, then 
with no strength needed and no thought expended, freed from birth 
and death, you become Buddha.’’2
In contrast to this religious standpoint, in the modem period there 
are a number of positions which deny the existence of what is known as 
an “ absolute” in religious terms, claiming instead that such an asser­
tion is oppressive. Some of these arguments maintain that all things are 
based on human consciousness or knowledge, but I will not deal with 
them here. Whether one sees such positions as rational or irrational, 
scientific or antiscientific, nowhere do we find in these modem conclu-
3 Because, of course, Ddgen’s own standpoint was that of understanding this issue 
from a Zen perspective, namely the Buddhist position that samsara equals nirvana, his 
attitude differs greatly from the general religious point of view. The above quote is 
from the “ ShOji” [Samsara] chapter in Shobogenzo (ch. 92 o f the standard edition), 
and begins, “ Because the Buddha is in samsara, there is no samsara. It is also said, be­
cause the Buddha is not in samsara, one is not confused in samsara.”  The above 
quotes, as well as, “ this samsara is none other than the holy life of the Buddha," must 
be understood from this Zen point of view.
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sions any genuine confrontation with the problem of death (or in Bud­
dhist terms, the problem of samsOra)\ they make no attempt to con­
front the problem and thus they have nothing to offer that would lead 
to a solution. In not offering a proper solution to the problem of life 
and death, these philosophical positions cannot possibly know even of 
the existence of a place buried in the depths of one’s own existence and 
the world where the answer to this eternal question lies.
Among those modem viewpoints which deny the existence of God, 
the only one that has managed to touch this place is nihilism in the 
word’s original (i.e., philosophical) sense. Such nihilism incorporates 
the problem of death and its triumph, and accordingly confronts the is­
sue of religious an jin, including its metaphysical dimension as well. Be­
cause this point of view is based on the concept of nothingness, this is 
only to be expected. Even Nietzsche’s active nihilism can be seen as a 
search for a new solution in the modem period when certainty is ques­
tioned regarding traditional Western questions of anxiety and death. 
The denial of preexisting solutions to anxiety and the conquest of 
death resulted in a fundamental rejection of long-standing traditions in 
metaphysics and religion.3
The standpoint of Zen, however, has the characteristic of occupying 
a third position between that generally found in religion and philos­
ophy on the one hand and nihilism on the other. In Zen, the Great 
Death, more than anything else, means liberating oneself from pre­
judices toward both the self itself and the world, dying to one’s self 
and to the world. Not ending there, it goes further still in seeking libera­
tion from any position of reliance upon Buddha or God, from faith in
3 Hegel's philosophy can be seen as the grandest attempt in modern times to unify 
Christianity with the metaphysical tradition dating from the Greeks. Within the works 
o f  those who first confronted Hegel—namely, Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer—the is­
sues o f death and nihilism were hidden motivating forces. In the case o f Kierkegaard, 
these cast a shadow in his thought on anxiety and despair. Schopenhauer sought to 
overcome death in a Buddhist-like nirv&na (understood here as a Hlnayina Buddhist 
nirvana) as the dissolution o f  the will to live. In any case, death and nihilism are prob­
lems that do not countenance speculation; that is. they emerge into consciousness as 
problems essential to one's own existence (and by extension, human existence) and can 
be truly solved only by oneself. This type o f  problem consciousness prescribed the ba­
sic attitude o f  these thinkers when they philosophized, propelling them to confront 
Hegel. Nietzsche finally concluded that Schopenhauer's “ Buddhist”  stance was “ ni­
hilism as pessimism,” and thereupon hammered out his own theory o f  active nihilism.
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and even contemplative visions of Buddha and God. As long as a 
relationship to God or Buddha is supporting the stability of one’s exis­
tence, any such form of anjin is an anjin with strings attached. No mat­
ter how certain the support from the side of God or Buddha, no matter 
how definite one’s certainty about that support, this type of certainty 
remains limited to the certainty of a fetus still connected by its umbili­
cal cord to its mother, the certainty of a child who walks holding his 
mother’s hand. This is obviously not the certainty of someone of in­
dependent thought and action who has discovered that wellspring from 
within oneself. Regardless of how much the certainty of one’s existence 
is founded upon an absolute other, there will always be something on 
the side of the self that remains to be fulfilled, and to this extent the 
path of self investigation for such an individual has yet to be complet­
ed.
There is an example in medieval Europe of someone whose investi­
gation of the self itself penetrated to that exalted level. For Meister 
Eckhart, the attempt to return to the basis of the soul went beyond a 
deeply personal love of God to a position whereby he declared, “ I take 
my leave from God.” How much more so in the modern period when 
scientific knowledge has once again awakened within philosophy, 
philosophy has become independent of theology, and since Bacon and 
Descartes a new awakening to and establishment of the “ self” in hu­
man beings, a new investigation of self, has begun. We have emerged 
from the serious conflict between the theists and the atheists, finally 
broken through the whirlpool of nihilism, and now the investigation of 
the matter of self has entered a stage of major exploration. The stage 
now is one where we face the limit of anxiety and uncertainty. And in 
the present situation there are obvious reasons why the anjin of Zen 
should be reexamined.
II
The investigation into the matter of self in Zen expresses itself in such 
phrases as “ Above the Buddhas, beyond the patriarchs,” or “ Kill the 
Buddha, kill the patriarchs,” wherein one goes beyond the dominating 
sphere of the patriarchal lineage. One does not stop at the notion of a 
self saved by the power of the great compassion of the Buddha as 
manifest in his enjoyment-body, as a self born into the Buddha’s per-
9
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sonal realm as a child (i.e., disciple) of the Buddha, or as one living un­
der the protection of a Buddha. Nor does one rest in a mode of contem­
plating the Dharma of the Buddha after one has opened up by oneself 
the light of great wisdom of the Buddha manifest as dharma-body/
In all these states, the self is still supported by its relationship with 
the Buddha or the Dharma, and to that extent, as I have stated above, 
there is a side of oneself the self has not been exhausted, hence there is 
a part of the self that can never fully become the self. If one takes this 
reliance on the Buddha or the Buddhist Teachings as a shackle, then 
only by cutting it off can one truly return to the self itself, become the 
self itself, and penetrate to one’s original countenance. This was the 
way of the patriarchs, and it is how the awakening to the Buddha (the 
so-called self realization of Buddha-mind) and the content of that reali­
zation (the dharma-treasury that is the Buddha-mind) truly become 
one’s own possession for the first time, when the self can stand on a 
footing equivalent to that of a living Buddha.
In Zen, however, even upon attaining the “ Zen”  of the patriarchs, 
that is, becoming conversant with and free to move within that realm, 
the process of the investigation into the matter of self has not been com­
pleted; one is not there yet. In this situation the self continues to be sup­
ported by the patriarchs—one is still under the supervision of the 
patriarchs, as it were. This could be compared to a young man who is 
independent to the point of earning a living, but still under the shadow 
of his parents, is unable to fully extend his own sphere of influence to 
others. This is, in a most basic sense, reflective of the situation where 
someone is tied to their community (the Sangha)/ A self that has been 
made independent of Buddha and Dharma must go on to become in­
dependent of Sangha as well. This means cutting off the tradition of 
so-called mind-to-mind transmission of the truth in which the self­
realization of the Buddha-mind and the content of the Teachings 
have been passed down from Sakyamuni through the patriarchs. (The 
meaning in which I speak of “ community” and “ tradition” here is not 
simply a historical one. Rather these are things that at once express the 
essential spatiality and temporality of the self in the realm of religion 
as well as an existentialist sociality and historicity of religious existence 
itself.)
In this way all relationships of the self itself are to be cut off, and 
through the abandonment of all frameworks and restrictions, for the
10
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first time the self truly returns to the self itself, and as the self itself 
freedom is obtained. This freedom is not that of person, Dharma, or 
Buddha; it is the origin of the original self, before the beginnings of any 
tradition. And that origin is the beginning of all beginnings, a true 
freedom, a freedom in which there is true unity between the freedom 
from all things and the freedom to all things.4
In the context of this freedom it is possible to re-establish a connec­
tion to tradition. The severing of tradition is the true fusing with tradi­
tion. That severance is an opening to the standpoint of a truly creative 
freedom. It is a direct participation in the tradition of the Buddhas and 
patriarchs wherein it is as if there were nothing one could do which 
would not be creative, a living continuation of a living tradition. In ad­
dition this is where there is the possibility of a true encounter with a 
Buddha or a patriarch, because the Buddhas and patriarchs originally 
were people of such experiences. Such an encounter can only mean a 
manifestation of the true communit as, as in the phrase: “ Divided for 
millions of years but not apart for even an instant; facing each other 
throughout the day but not face to face for even a moment.” *
In other words, in the path to the knowledge of self, the issue of 
certainty should not be something confirmed by anything outside the 
self, regardless of what this may mean. Whether this be the Buddha, 
Dharma, or Sangha (i.e., the so-called patriarchs and the so-called 
spiritual guides [kalyHnamitra] that make up the community and its 
tradition), one must not stop at a confirmation of self that comes 
from any of these which are, after all, outside the self. To stop here is 
to veil the true self through the patronage of the self by these forces. 
The certainty of self must always be something confirmed by the self 
itself; only by means of the self itself—herein accordingly the self be­
comes absolutely “ alone” —can there be a certainty that is truly certain. 
The certainty that is attainable for one who has extricated oneself from 
any and all forms of “ other” is the certainty of a true self. That is, the
4 This must be termed an absolute freedom but here, as I will discuss below, all non- 
freedoms are also free. For example, although an elbow naturally does not bend out­
ward, in the situation where illness prevents it from bending inward, both express a 
lack o f  freedom. From the point o f  view o f what has been established as the very begin­
ning o f  this reality as well as the reasons (and law) included within it—in the words of 
Western thought, the basis o f  a Creator God—therein lies something like an absolute 
freedom in which the freedom to reality and the freedom from it are one.
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proof that it is possible to break away [from all supports] in this 
manner is a confirmation of self in terms of the final and ultimate poss­
ibility included in the very essence of one’s existence. Such confirma­
tion, or self-realization, is none other than the certainty of self. Here 
the confirming and what is confirmed are one. This is what is meant by 
penetrating to where one sees one’s original face. That vision is the 
disclosure of the original countenance, when the self becomes the true 
self.
This is the only time one can truly say the clouds of doubt are com­
pletely gone. Attaining this indubitability means the self is truly able to 
confirm the self itself. This is the ground of true anjin. Until one 
reaches this point, one cannot escape the fact that everything one en­
counters in this world, including the self itself that exists within it and 
even one’s interactions with Buddha, the Teachings and religious per­
sonages, are all exposed as lying within the scope of the Great Doubt. 
As long as the existence of self is established by means of protection by 
some kind of “ other,”  in other words, as long as the certainty of the 
self is based on a relationship with an “ other,” that certainty exists es­
sentially within a significant degree of doubt.5 The clearing away of this
3 This “ Great Doubt” is not simply an irresolvable form o f the doubt that arises 
from the subjective opinions o f  each individual. It is a doubt that can arise in relation 
to what is absolutely eternal, like the relationship between the self itself and the world, 
or God/Buddha; or a doubt regarding the objective reasoning that dominates that 
relationship. As a doubt regarding the self itself on the plane o f  the self itself, it is a 
case where this has been existentialized. By its philosophical and ontological nature 
such doubt is directly transformed into an existential question. In this sense, it may be 
said to be existential and immediately existent, existent and immediately existential. 
Or, in a new way, it may be possible to consider this position as transcendent. Without 
stopping even at this Great Doubt, Zen transcends all standpoints o f  thought or think­
ing, while at the same time somehow encompassing substantial thought or thinking at 
the point o f  that transcendence. On the extreme o f  that transcendent point where we 
find the stick o f  Te-shan and the shout o f  Lin-chi, not a shadow o f thought or think­
ing remains. In such things as Lin-chi's “ four shouts’* and “ four outlooks*** we can 
recognize the traces o f  a deliberative thought transformed by a flash o f  insight. The 
shikan taza (zazen alone) position advocated by DOgen is found in his ShObOgenzO, 
where on the topic o f  zazen he writes, “ If one maintains this, it will be [like] a powerful 
scarecrow in a field.”  In the background o f this “ scarecrow” is the expansive dharma- 
dhatu, which includes the entirety o f  the universe and humanity. The investigation of 
this dharma-dhatu is illustrated by the standpoint, “ How does one measure the im­
measurable? By nonmeasurement.** In Zen dialogues we frequently see language such
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Great Doubt requires the penetration to that final possibility that is lo­
cated within one’s self-existence and thus essentially within the exis­
tence known as humanity. For this reason, the severing of every con­
ceivable relationship with an “ other” is nothing less than what is 
known as the Great Death.
Included within the term “ Great Death”  is the notion that not just 
the world or the self dies but also the Buddhas and the patriarchs die. 
The path of investigating the self demands this degree of thoroughness. 
One must go through the experience of letting go of their hold on to 
what keeps them from falling and after dying then coming back to life 
once again. This is the ground of absolute affirmation. The self that 
one confronts when one is reborn after the self itself has died is the self 
on the ground of this absolute affirmation. Returning here, for the first 
time one accepts oneself absolutely. Here one can approve of one’s exis­
tence as good in and of itself. This also means truly reaching the certain­
ty of self.
The certainty of the existence of self that one encounters as a result 
of doubting even the existence of the world or God—as Descartes was 
said to doubt everything that could be doubted—can truly be affirmed 
only because one has actually encountered this self after passing 
through this Great Death. When one removes any reliance on God or 
Buddha and is able to affirm oneself truly in a place where he has tran­
scended the dominating sphere of the patriarchal line from the Bud­
dha, when one can confirm one’s own existence, then for the first time 
one is able to encounter the selfs original face. This is a self-knowledge 
that cannot be destroyed by anything, and as such can destroy every­
thing impeding its penetration to the self. This self-knowledge of the cer­
tainty of existence at the same time also includes an awareness of the
as “ You’ve got it,”  or to “ get it.” What is the standpoint o f this “nonmeasurement” 
or “getting it” ? Zen is religious and philosophical, while at the same time it can be 
called nonreligious and nonphilosophical (nonreligious by means being philosophical, 
and nonphilosophical by means o f religious). What is this position that is religiously 
nonreligious, philosophically nonphilosophical. At the same time, besides incorporat­
ing both these positions, what is standpoint of the entirety o f Zen itself? For example, 
where does it resemble or differ from the speculative mysticism from Plotinus to Jacob 
Boehme, or the standpoint of Kiekegaard’s “ second directness” (indirect communica­
tion) and “ second philosophy” ? Regarding the basic position of Zen, an investigation 
from this point of view is a problem remaining for the future.
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certainty of that self-knowledge. This totality of certainty regarding 
both existence and knowledge is the indubitability of the existence of 
the self; i.e., when the self no longer holds any doubt about the self 
itself.
Manifest in an awareness of self-existence, such indubitability means 
the self itself is none other than the endpoint of the investigation into 
the matter of self. And from the standpoint of Zen in which this investi­
gation is central, this is truly an important issue. In the introspection 
within the self that occurs during this self-investigation, as long as 
there remains something that one cannot resign oneself to, some feel­
ing however faint in which the self cannot relax, this inquiry will inevi­
tably continue to advance regardless of where it leads. This is the con­
science of Zen. And for this reason a persistently severe and sharply 
critical mentality, directed above all toward oneself, is required. This 
point of view unavoidably creates an attitude toward the teachings of 
the Buddha and patriarchs that is fundamentally different from that of 
Buddhism in general, yielding a vital clue to unraveling the question of 
what exactly is this point of view in which indubitability is the conclu­
sion of the investigation into the matter of self, the certainty of self­
existence that is confirmed by the self itself where one has transcended 
the sphere of Buddhas and patriarchs. Let us now consider this point.
Ill
Zen continuously makes the point that, “ Not to doubt words is a 
great illness.” No matter how sincerely one may revere scripture, no 
matter how deep one’s understanding, it is a great illness to stop there. 
The reason is that within that situation one still harbors doubts about 
the self as there remains territory within the self yet to be probed. As 
long as one has not reached that place beyond the Buddhas and 
patriarchs where one affirms the self by the self itself, where one is 
confirmed by oneself, one is not there yet, not free yet.
For example, the following dialogue is recorded between Ku-yin 
Yiin-ts’ung and his disciple. When the disciple quoted the words of the 
ancient master Shih-t’ou, “ Attachment to things has always meant con­
fusion, conforming to principle is not enlightenment either,”  Ku-yin 
asked him, “ Are you using that as an expression of medicine or as an 
expression of illness?” The student of course answered that these were
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words of healing, whereupon Ku-yin scolded him w ith ,4 * You take ill­
ness and call it medicine—why would you do such a thing?” He also 
said, “ If words do not leave the nest, how can one leave behind the 
self-imposed veils and restrictions of the mind?” '
In the history of Zen there seems to be an uncountable number of dia­
logues similar to this one. These express in the most graphic manner 
the individual standpoint of Zen. Above everything, the original stand­
point of Buddhism is to abandon one’s attachments to things, awaken 
to the principles of the Teachings and live accordingly. The explana­
tions of doctrinal scholars struggling to unravel the teachings of the 
Dharma as contained in the scriptures are indeed antidotes prescribed 
for the illnesses of sentient beings. Accordingly the words of Shih-t’ou, 
“ conforming to principle is not enlightenment either,”  indicate a 
further transformation of this basic Buddhist position to something 
transcendent, an exalted position within Buddhism itself. These are 
medicinal words to combat what might be termed a higher dimension 
of illness where one is restricted by Buddhist truth itself.
Although such progressive words of the Zen tradition like these 
sound a warning to those based in the scriptural tradition who may 
face some infirmity lurking within their own natures, in fact this dia­
logue points out that even this message can itself become a source of 
further illness. The problem does not lie in what is being discussed but 
how one receives what is said. Thus the attitude displayed in the 
phrase, “ Not doubting the word,” is precisely the Great Illness. Even 
if one clearly comprehends from the Zen point of view the words of 
patriarchs which themselves express that same Zen point of view and as 
a result achieves a penetrating insight into one’s own mind and even 
reaches the enlightenment of grasping one’s self-nature (kenshO), that 
by itself would not be the endpoint of the investigation into the matter 
of self. Rather, one would end up with a situation whereby one’s lucid 
Zen satori is actually concealing Zen satori itself. In other words, the 
very acceptance of medicinal language as medicinal language is a Great 
Illness.
In the same sense it is also said, “ Do not engage in dead words, prac­
tice live words.”  No matter what the medicinal words may be, 
whenever they are accepted as just that, those words are dead idioms. 
They kill the self just as imbibing poison would the physical body. I say 
that these healing words are the basis of illness and death because they
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obscure the path to the attainment of what I have discussed above as 
“ freedom” for the self—the self itself in the locus of absolute confirma­
tion. They render that great freedom as something not yet available. In 
that situation the self sits within the enclosure of the patriarchs who 
originally articulated those medicinal words. Those same words may 
lead to insights into one’s own mind, cure a variety of mental ills pro­
duced from within oneself, and help one to reach a certainty of self­
existence and affirmation of one’s self as good, but the ground of that 
confidence is established on the lack of doubt regarding the patriarch’s 
words. Hence the path of investigating the matter of self wherein 
the certainty of self is confirmed by the self itself without relying on 
anything outside is not yet completed. This is where the attained 
indubitability itself veils the final step to true indubitability. With a 
sense of relief that all of one’s problems have now been solved, this cre­
ates a relaxed feeling of assurance that results in stopping at an anjin 
within the borders of the patriarchs. In a word, one becomes a prisoner 
within the castle of one’s own relief.
The ancients referred to this situation as “ being turned around by 
another’s words.”  Because one is only following the words of the 
patriarchs there is an implication of subordinating oneself to their 
authority or essentially being under their dominance or control. Yet 
the individual does not realize this is going on.
This is what is meant by “ being turned around by another’s words.” 
This is also what Ku-yin probably meant by, “ If words do not leave the 
nest, how can one leave behind the self-imposed veils and restrictions 
of the mind?” The word “ nest”  here refers to a place of security for 
birds and animals. The “ veils and restrictions”  are those things that 
bind one to that traditional enclosure or compound, giving one a sense 
of support and security. To the extent that one does not doubt these 
words they have the character of commands handed down by those 
patriarchs, or rules establishing a law. One’s sense of anjin in this situa­
tion should be understood as that which arises from following orders, 
as if something prescribed by law.
Of course the orders or laws in this situation are not the same as 
natural laws or moral laws where the self is under the domination of 
something outside the self itself. Not doubting the words of the 
patriarchs may mean one has achieved a place of indubitability within 
the self itself, having returned to the original ground of one’s own
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mind, and gained the freedom derived from seeing into one’s Buddha- 
nature (kenshO). In this sense the self has become the self itself, has 
become free—a standpoint where there are no laws or commands com­
ing from anywhere outside. Yet even in this place one is controlled by 
hidden commands and laws.
But there is also a wellspring of subtle law that can make one’s own 
existence something absolutely free vis-A-vis the other side where all 
natural laws and moral laws operate. While opening up a limitless 
horizon of activity for the complete freedom of self, this law becomes 
the hidden ground of freedom latent in the foundation of that free­
dom, as it opens up a locale where complete freedom for the self can be 
realized. The commands implied in this situation are strong, declara­
tive and conclusive nature, and are quite decisive and affirmative by na­
ture.
It is well known that Kant was a superlative lawgiver who, by placing 
humans on the standpoint of practical reason, himself established the 
laws of reason. At the same time he expounded a so-called autonomy 
of practical reason that meant following those laws himself, and which 
thereby provided a foundation for morality. At this position of auto­
nomy the commands which order us to follow the laws of morality arc 
generated from within each of us. Thus to the degree that each person 
is truly himself or herself they cannot otherwise but follow those com­
mands unconditionally. Kant called these categorical imperatives. But 
no matter how entirely subjective these imperatives may be, one cannot 
escape them becoming conscious to the self in the form of commands. 
To this extent, these too retain something of the nature of being exter­
nal. This autonomously realized moral freedom thus is not an absolute 
freedom. That is why in his theory of religion Kant posits God’s decree 
to be the moral rule which restricts the establishment of moral free­
dom.
Regarding our concern here, however—freedom from the Zen point 
of view—the issue of freedom is not simply a moral question. The Zen 
concept would not even fit into Kant’s notion of a categorical impera­
tive. And even if we called it a religious freedom (generally understood 
as an imperative coming from the Absolute), still it would not be in­
cluded in the notion of following the decrees of God. In this sense, it is 
none other than what the words say: absolute freedom. This is the stand­
point which states that what flows out from one’s own bosom covers
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heaven and earth. This in itself implies that the legal restrictions latent 
[in the Zen notion of freedom] are a far more conclusive imperative 
than any rules of moral law or any rules based on decrees of God.
In Buddhism there are said to be three jewels or treasures: the Bud­
dha, the Dharma and the Sangha. Ontologically or philosophically 
speaking, if the Dharma points to the essential way of being and way of 
appearing of all things in the world, then all things return inclusively to 
the dharma-body of the Buddha (the so-called dharmata-dharmakaya). 
To enter that dharma-body by means of properly enlightened wisdom 
in the Dharma and to open up the perfect enlightenment equal to a Bud­
dha within one's own mind is the goal of being human in Buddhism. 
Even beyond this, it is stipulated that according to the Teachings the 
path of practice leads one to the astonishing goal of nothing less than 
omniscient wisdom. Practice is also one part of the teachings. Char­
acterized by the fusion of knowledge and practice it is the practice of 
compassion linked with the development of a wisdom of self-enlighten­
ment which, like the selfless pledge to save all living things, which is a 
manifestation of the Buddha's Teaching, an imperative for Buddhism.
In short, the Buddhist Teaching has the power to mold humanity 
into a moral or religious existence; the Buddha's Dharma is dominant 
universally in every aspect of the world and mankind. In the Dharma 
we have the traces of the life, strength, and work of a Buddha who 
totalizes the totality of the world and mankind. From the development 
of this notion of the Dharma came the three bodies of the Buddha: the 
dharma-body, the enjoyment-body, and the transformation-body. The 
Buddha is thus a Buddha with three bodies that are simultaneously 
one. And taking refuge in this Buddha, living one's life based on fol­
lowing his teachings, is a description of a religious person and the con­
fraternity of such (i.e., the Sangha). For example, the fifteenth century 
JOdo Shinshfl leader Rennyo once saw a piece of paper that someone 
had dropped in the hallway and, commenting that this was part of the 
Buddha's Dharma and should not be treated as insignificant, raised it 
reverently to his head. Only a religious person would view a piece of 
paper as belonging to the realm of the Buddha's Teaching, as a posses­
sion of the Buddha and thus to be revered.
However, the investigation into the matter of self within the Zen tra­
dition does not end when one finds assurance within the realm of the 
Dharma; it must continue further and try to reach the ultimate place in
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the Buddha’s Teaching. One may call this an investigation directed 
towards that place which is the elemental source of all things, digging 
out the self and the foundation upon which that self rests. To seek the 
original source of the Dharma is to search for the Buddha who, in 
dominating all being, all things in the world and in humankind, total­
izes everything by means of his Teaching. It is to search for the original 
source of the Buddha himself, his life, his power (including the so- 
called power of the Original Vow) and his work. This is what a Zen per­
son calls “ the place from which all Buddhas came,”  wherein all Bud­
dhas means the original source manifesting the form of “ Buddha.” 
The investigation into this original source through the self itself is none 
other than [an investigation into] the original source of the self itself.
In this situation even what is called the Buddha’s dharma-body is no 
longer the original source of the Buddha. Of course it is said that the 
dharma-body of the Buddha has nothing discernible and is thus de­
scribed as formless, and that having no form, the dharma-body is the 
ground of everything that has form. As far as the self is concerned, to 
the degree that the Buddha and his dharma-body are still seen or con­
ceived of as having the nature of “ something other,” however, these 
are still objects of contemplation and thus the “ formless”  takes on a 
kind of form. One must look for the genuine source of the Buddha in a 
place that transcends any notion of Dharma as a “ body” of a Buddha. 
At that time the original source of the Buddha will have shed any na­
ture of being “ something other”  and one will have no choice but to 
return to that point directly under that searching self itself, up to the 
central axis of the self itself penetrating the self. At the same time this 
is a unitary, absolute standpoint encompassing one’s entirety and can­
not in any sense be objectified. Thus what is truly formless cannot pos­
sibly be anything but the absolute self. The original source of the Bud­
dha that one is searching for is at bottom, originally, the original 
source of the self itself. For this reason, for example, even in Tillich’s 
conception that the root of religious existence is one’s “ ultimate con­
cern,” insofar as he still sees the “ ground of being” as God, he is think­
ing in terms of an other. As long as one affirms that one’s relationship 
to that ground of being is one of an existential “ participation,” from 
the Zen point of view this cannot be said to constitute the final step.6
6 Of course Tillich did not trample on the traditional view of God in Christian theol-
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ogy. Rather, he pursued God while touching on the modern historical situation. This 
superlative thinker finally reached the end o f  his pursuit when he spoke o f  faith in “ the 
God above God.**
On the other hand, as I have mentioned above, to the degree that we regard the 
usual, conscious self (what Buddhism calls the self o f  discrimination) as the self itself, 
it goes without saying that everything that is not the self will be seen as ‘‘other.”  And 
when that self seeks what it is that causes both oneself and everything else to be, it is 
natural and even logical that this will lead to consideration o f  a transcendent other 
such as ‘‘God’* or “ Buddha,” in some cases an absolutely transcendent other. 
Whether one sees this transcendent other as the product o f  human imagination like 
Feuerbach or as the opiate o f  the masses as in Marxism, or even something more seri­
ous, none o f  these views is sufficient to resolve the issue. From their viewpoint, the 
search for God or Buddha itself is a vain effort, but in fact there is a true reason deep 
within the individual for such questioning. However, even when such questions have 
been raised, the individual rarely questions the ground upon which he himself is stand­
ing, or even if  he does question this, problems usually remain with how the questions 
are asked. All o f  that notwithstanding, the seeking o f  God or Buddha arises as an 
inevitability inherent in the essence o f  what it is to be human. This is what the ancients 
called “ the great matter o f  life and death,” the vexing issue that eternally dogs the hu­
man condition. As emphasized by Kierkegaard and others, this is a matter that must be 
treated with the proper gravity. It cannot be taken care o f  simply by redirecting it into 
a social “ love o f  mankind,** or by analyzing it as an issue o f  class theory seen from a 
materialistic view o f history, or by reducing it to a psychoanalytic problem o f the sex­
ual libido. The basic problematic outlined in all these viewpoints reifies the matter into 
something shallow.
As long as the investigation into the matter o f self is not resolved, as long as the 
ground o f that great freedom discussed above remains unrealized within oneself, all 
being, all things within mankind and the world itself will, as seen from the self, be 
something “ other.”  And everything considered “ other” is, by this rule, in the hands 
o f an absolute Other. Hakuin compared this situation to someone “ crying for thirst in 
the middle o f  water,”  or, “ the son o f  a wealthy household who loses himself in pov­
erty.** Such a person has forgotten that all being, all things and all teachings are held in 
the precious storehouse o f  his parent’s home and that from the moment o f  his succes­
sion this will unquestionably become his own possession. Instead he sees his parents as 
outsiders, separates himself from the family and looks toward the outside, becoming 
someone whose course is determined by what he looks for in others. As long as this 
state o f  ignorance o f  the self (called avidyO in Buddhism and original sin in 
Christianity) is essentially rooted in actual human existence, it will be inevitable that we 
wander about facing the “ outside.”  It will also be inevitable that we grow tired o f  this 
confusion and seek out an absolute Other who can grant us peace and comfort. At that 
point we begin to search for what was originally our own treasure as i f  it were some­
thing possessed by that which is “ other”  to us. This is the equivalent o f  assuming that 
one does not have the strength within oneself and so asks to be conferred it by the head 
o f another family.
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To take this one step further, because o f  an original oblivion to the self by oneself, 
the responsibility o f  this unsettled situation leads one to look on it as if  it were a debt 
toward the Other. Thus what was originally one’s own property is rewritten under the 
pretext o f  a loan from another, wherein the individual either works hard to buy this 
back, or humbly asks for what amounts to an unrepayable gift from the Other. In 
other words, while one is in the midst o f the process o f  investigating the matter o f  self 
and no resolution has been reached, there is a sense o f  debt incurred tied up incessantly 
with the conception o f  an Other which is transcendent to the self yet manifest in a  varie­
ty o f  ways. This is the inevitable state o f  things during the development o f  reason.
As long as the original source o f  the self itself has been forgotten while one is wander­
ing about in other lands, the original storehouse o f  the self is put under the safekeeping 
o f God or Buddha who, in the form o f an Other, has custody o f  it in until the delusion 
is lifted. Although there are various stages o f  awakening that arise in the process o f  in­
vestigating the matter o f  self such as a certainty oLself or the assurance (aryin) that 
comes with a sense o f  satisfaction in the self itself, this other-centered point o f  view 
will always function as a hammer pulverizing the various forms o f  return to the self 
that occur as answers in the course o f  one’s questioning.
That people after a  period o f  time become suspicious o f  the assumption that their 
own thinking is sound is not at all unusual even in the religious world. Yet do we not 
see manifest in that self seeking a new personal certainty a structuring whereby what is 
sought is once again reaffirmed under the rubric o f  otherness by means o f  such things 
as Buddha or Buddhadharma? This is because from a standpoint unable to escape com­
pletely the relative two-dimensionality o f  self and other, the only all-inclusive, absolute 
one-dimensionality that one can recollect is that o f  the Other. But if  the aryin which 
has been given to the self from a standpoint centered on an absolute other remains 
problematic for the investigation into the self (these days this problem is linked to the 
rise o f  nihilism, but I will not deal with that issue here), then we have a situation where 
there is an inevitable questioning o f the origins o f  Buddha or Buddhism. Such ques­
tions must be asked in a  way that returns to the bottom o f  the self itself; put directly to 
the self it must inquire as to the origins o f the self itself. The examination o f  God or 
Buddha must become an examination o f  self. The all-inclusive standpoint recalled 
from the side o f  the Other is, from the side o f self, now recalled from within the self. It 
is by means o f  this that the investigation into the matter o f  self can be thorough. As 
stated above, the path to the original source o f the existence o f  self simultaneously in­
cludes all inquiries into the original source o f  Buddha or Buddhadharma. It is then, for 
the first time, that such inquiries become genuine.
Seen from the point o f  view o f the thoroughgoing investigation into self within Zen, 
any calling to mind o f a transcendent other or any o f  the accompanying phenomena as­
sociated with this are no different from considering one’s own treasures as belonging to 
someone else. Here the term, “ as-if”  has been used frequently to reinterpret concepts 
related to trans-empirical realms from the standpoint o f Neo-Kantian criticism (kritizis- 
mus). Based on the Kantian method o f  analysis, in his Die Phiiosophie des A ls-ob  (The 
Philosophy o f  As-If] (1911), Vaihinger attempted to show (not only for metaphysics 
and religion) the fictive nature o f  all concepts associated with realms o f  speculative
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Returning to one’s original source is to leave behind any mode of 
being based in the power of “ Buddha” or “ Dharma.”  It is to be 
released from a locale framed by the dominion of Buddha or Dharma 
and to open up a standpoint of true liberty and freedom—it is this that 
can be called the true ultimate. Even if this formless self is opened up 
as the original source of the self, in that this signifies a resolution to the 
investigation of self, it is at the same time a return to the self of a 
manifest reality where the self has form. If one considers what is 
referred to as the formless self to be something separate from the di* 
rectly known self of manifest reality, this is in fact not the true formless
knowledge and indeed the necessity o f  seeing these as mental constructions.
The notion that trans-empirical conceptions have the character o f  always being “ as 
i f ’ should be accepted, but the approach o f  these philosophers comes from a complete­
ly different point o f  view. We are not talking about something which, from the stand­
point o f  “ experience,”  transcends the possibility o f empirical proof, but rather, from 
the standpoint o f  the investigation into the matter o f  self, about a form which further 
shrouds what can be proved in the complete examination o f self. Here, “ as i f '  definite­
ly does not mean simply a Active nature. Since everything which can be said to have a 
fictive nature belongs to the self-development o f  reality in the path to the invesigation 
of the matter o f  self, if  we were to label all o f  this as fiction, then it must be a fiction 
that has more reality than what is usually called real. It conceals a new reality in the 
background, and seen from this reality, what normally is referred to as real exhibits the 
characteristics, rather, o f  illusion. God or Buddha and everything associated with them 
are, in terms o f  the investigation into the matter o f  self, very solemn issues; it is impera­
tive that one understands them with proper dignity.
In Zen, when one speaks o f  transcending the Buddhas and Patriarchs or killing the 
Buddhas and Patriarchs, this o f course comes from the core o f Zen itself. It will not 
do, however, to assume this means that therefore one has put away the issue o f  Bud­
dha. Trivializing the problem o f Buddha creates the danger o f  taking Zen frivolously. 
There is a traditional saying, “ Those in the Zen tradition love frivolity,”  indicating 
there has actually been such danger for quite some time. On the other hand, it is alright 
to be frivolous for a great person o f  freedom who has removed from their shoulders 
the heavy burden o f such things as Buddha or Buddhadharma. To borrow a metaphor 
from Nietzsche, if  one does not kneel down before everything noble to carry it on one’s 
back as a camel, one cannot be transformed into a lion. If one cannot become a lion 
who reigns over all animals on a desert with nothing, that person cannot be trans­
formed into a child. The frivolity o f  a child on a beach who draws figures in the sand 
only to have them wiped out by the ocean waves—the danger o f taking things in this 
kind o f frivolous manner is always latent in the path o f  Zen. This is illustrated in the 
fact that Nietzsche himself was dismissed frivolously by the populace as the man who 
killed God.
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self and thus not the true conclusion to one’s investigation. The self 
which is truly formless is expressed in the phrase, “ If there is no Bud­
dha in sarpsSra, one is without restrictions in sarpsQra.”  No Buddha in 
saipsAra means freedom of the formless self; “ without restrictions in 
sarjisOra" is liberty?
I will come back to this below, but the self manifest in its present 
place is at once the formless self. The truly final point of this investiga­
tion can be said to be manifest in the self in this way of being. And the 
viewpoints of the patriarchs in the Zen tradition reveal a resolution to 
the investigation of self that is in this dimension. It is one of the special 
characteristics of Zen that it emphasizes the way of being of the 
patriarchs. The internal self-realization of Buddha means the manifest 
realization active in manifest reality. By means of returning to the origi­
nal source of the self which has transcended “ Buddha,” one reflects 
the living work of all the Buddhas and patriarchs beginning with 
Sakyamuni in this manifest reality. In other words, in establishing the 
Buddhist Teaching as a living Buddhist Teaching adapted to the circum­
stances of the present situation, a standpoint has been provided that en­
ables each person to obtain true liberty for his/her self and become en­
lightened to his/her intrinsic, enormous freedom. Therefore, from the 
standpoint of questioning whether or not one has indeed arrived at the 
conclusion of their search, if it is affirmed that one has not doubted the 
words of the patriarchs and has stopped within the enclosure of those 
patriarchs, this means that that person cannot be confirmed as having 
reached a true conclusion. To be where one is turned around by the lan­
guage of the patriarchs is to not yet have either true independence or 
true freedom. To attain these goals one must give up any participation 
in dead language and participate in living words.
IV
“ To participate in living words”  is to abandon the pursuit of language 
that has already been produced and to inquire instead into the original 
self of the person who produced that language. It means to inquire into 
that person’s “ home-ground.” One visits where that person lives and 
at the entrance, one opens the mouth of his/her self-itself; it is a direct 
visit to that “ person.”  Transcending Buddha or patriarch (the Bud­
dhas and patriarchs as “ others” to one’s own self), one takes the origi-
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nal source manifested in the Buddhas and patriarchs and, in a word, 
self-transforms it absolutely into oneself. The patriarchs were just such 
people—individuals who were compelled to inquire into the self. A 
patriarch, a living patriarch, is someone who has gone to the point of 
realizing (in himself) a living “ person”  as the manifest reality of Bud­
dha. And any questioning directed at the original source of this living 
patriarch is none other than an inquiry into the home-ground of that 
patriarch. “ To participate in living words” can only mean, from the 
mind of one living person to another, going out and knocking on their 
door.
This is illustrated in the example of the well-known story of the emi­
nent scholar Liang-sui’s audience with Ma-ku.* Ma-ku saw Liang-sui 
coming, picked up a hoe and went into the vegetable garden. When 
Liang-sui followed him into the garden, Ma-ku ran back to his room 
and closed the door. Liang-sui at that point had no choice but to return 
the next day. When he then knocked on Ma-ku’s closed door, he heard 
Ma-ku’s voice say, “ Who is it?” Without thinking, Liang-sui an­
swered, “ Liang-sui,” and at that instant he was enlightened. It is writ­
ten that he then faced Ma-ku and said, “ Master, you had better not de­
ceive Liang-sui. If I had come and not bowed to you in respect I would 
have been guilty of nearly an entire lifetime of impertinence toward the 
scriptures.” He is also known for remarking in a lecture delivered after 
returning home, “ The place everyone knows about, I know everything 
about. The place I know about, no one knows about.”
It is interesting that when Ma-ku saw Liang-sui coming he grabbed a 
hoe and went into the vegetable garden, and it is also interesting that 
when he saw Liang-sui follow him into the garden he ran back to his 
room and shut the door. The scene that Liang-sui witnessed is itself a 
living development of the Dharma. Ma-tsu’s closing the door and leav­
ing Liang-sui outside can be seen as an expression of what I have men­
tioned above as the absolute standpoint of total inclusion. At the same 
time, moreover, we can also see that between himself in this position 
and Liang-sui, Ma-ku has drawn a line of discontinuity that cannot be 
transcended. This is the final burden buried within Liang-sui’s state of 
being as yet personally unresolved, as well as the manner in which Ma- 
ku presented to him his ultimate limit. The refusal of Ma-ku to allow 
the visit is of course an act of great compassion. As a result of Ma-ku’s 
act Liang-sui knocked on the door, announced himself and in that mo-
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ment awakened to the truth, reaching a place where he could tell Ma- 
ku to his face not to deceive him.
These words are used again and again within the Zen tradition. For 
example, when DOgen returned from China, the first time he entered 
the hall to speak he said, “ I return home with empty hands.”  His state­
ment “ without being beguiled by the patriarchs”  is also well-known. 
The words “ deceive”  and “ beguile”  include implications of belittling 
or making a fool of, just like an adult might fool or coax an innocent 
child. Because a grownup stands in a dimension of “ knowledge” one 
level higher than that of a child, when he sees things with the light of 
that knowledge the thinking of the child becomes transparent to him. 
Even among adults we speak of one who can see clearly into someone’s 
heart.
When people are at different stages of “ knowledge”  such things oc­
cur naturally, but this kind of relationship also naturally manifests a 
form of deception, which is not necessarily something negative. If one 
takes advantage of this type of relationship in a way that is selfish, this 
truly can lead to “ deceiving”  someone; but when a grownup looks into 
what a child is thinking, it is usually for reasons of affection. It is said 
when Buddhas and bodhisattvas provide sentient beings with teach­
ings, it is like giving an autumn leaf to soothe a crying child whose 
thoughts one can see into. In Zen, there are stories of cut grass' which 
are said to arise out of compassion, but these, too, are all forms of de­
ception. To be led around by words of the patriarchs without doubting 
them, no matter how much one thinks they have helped to clarifiy is­
sues about himself, still means one has not rid oneself of the deception 
that one has accepted from the patriarchs. When one sets out [on the 
path to self-discoveryl, there is no reason to expect to be deceived by 
the patriarchs or their disciples either, but the way things are these 
relationships of deceiving and being deceived just come about natural­
ly.
Here we can see one problem basic to religion: the relationship be­
tween master and disciple—the one doing the teaching and the one 
being taught. My view is that the problem between master and disciple 
is a manifestation of an ultimate problem that exists between people as 
a whole. For example, in Christianity Christ is called the master and is 
considered the true teacher of the spirit for everyone. Later thinkers 
like Augustine or the medieval scholastics wrote religious and philo-
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sophical works on the significance of Christ as “ teacher.” Likewise 
in Buddhism, £akyamuni is called “ the teacher of men and gods” 
and “ the great leader.”  [But] the transmission of teachings or faith in 
religion is fundamentally something that occurs from one mind to 
another. The process is such that there will always be an ultimate 
character building (on the ground of the mind) of the disciple through 
the master, and by means of the disciple himself there will also be an ul­
timate self-formation or self-cultivation. At the root of the transmis­
sion of doctrine or faith there is always an educational dimension also 
included. This is true even for Zen, which rejects all instruction based 
on words or logic. Therefore it is worth taking a look at the master­
disciple relationship in Zen as a human relationship: what kind of 
structure does it have, what educational meaning is there in it?
In the case of Zen, which professes to be a “ transmission outside the 
teachings” and which “ directly points to the mind,”  the usual trans­
mission norms regarding doctrine or faith are not sufficient. By means 
of a complete investigation into oneself, it becomes a search for the 
original source of the self from the standpoint of the absolute “ I.” 
That original source is, as I have said above, the certainty of self on the 
field of absolute affirmation of the self by the self, without requiring 
any reliance on any sort of “ other.” The establishment of a standpoint 
seeking to penetrate to one’s original face in this way means the open­
ing up of a path one step beyond the realm of religion. And on this ad­
vanced path, anything remaining of the position where the words of 
the patriarchs are not doubted is designated to be a great ill.
This requires involvement in living words. To dialog with living 
words is, as stated above, to dialog with a “ master” as a living 
patriarch. A patriarch is someone who has transcended the Buddhas 
and patriarchs, continuing until reaching their original source; it is 
someone who has reached the point of realizing the self as person, liv­
ing in the present reality of Buddha. A patriarch is always a living 
patriarch, and as such is a master. And to go back and ask of the origi­
nal source of this master is to participate in living words. This type of 
query illustrates a resolve to try to penetrate even further, to conclusive­
ly exhaust the path of investigation into the matter of self no matter 
what. It is the expression of an extremely critical state of mind that, un­
til personally satisfied, will go anywhere in pursuit of the field of true 
resolution. As a feature of the Zen investigation of self, this special
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characteristic inevitably means the master-disciple relationship will ap­
pear as something quite different from that of religion in general, and 
particularly different from the normal didactic relationships between 
people outside the religious sphere.
Upon first glance, the shape of that relationship may seem complicat­
ed and even bizarre. But what is revealed here is the form unearthed at 
the very bottom of the bottom of didactic relationships in the world 
of religion which, in focusing on issues like these, represent what is 
actually manifest in such relationships present in all aspects of human 
society. If the essence of what is called education is firstly the formation 
of one person by another, and then the formation of a person by him­
self, then it is possible to understand these attempts to exhaustively 
investigate all the complications which become manifest in the relation­
ship between master and disciple in the Zen tradition, the relationships 
between people in general, and the relationship between an individual 
and his or her self itself.
These so-called complications or conflicts are all expressions of the 
investigation into the matter of self. And what we are calling participa­
tion in the living words of living patriarchs is none other than an indi­
cation of the field where this limit is located. I spoke of this above 
in terms of an inquiry into the origins of the patriarch’s hands or his 
bosom; inquiring into the original source of the patriarch who has 
become a Person, even while one’s own original source is the original 
source of Buddha. Knocking on the patriarch’s gate in this sense is not 
limited to the example of Liang-sui. Examples like these abound in the 
history of Zen and considering the subject matter, this is only to be ex­
pected.
There is also the famous example of the visit by Yiin-men to the gate 
of Chen-tsun-su where Huang-po had instructed Lin-chi.m When Yiin- 
men rapped on the gate, the teacher who opened it interrupted Yiin- 
men’s entering and demanded of him, “ Speak, speak!” Yiin-men was 
so taken aback he was unable to answer right away and when the 
teacher saw this, he pushed him out and closed the door. Some time 
later Yiin-men knocked on the door again and just as the door was 
being opened he tried to barge his way in. But just at that moment the 
door was closed, jamming his right foot in the doorway. Yiin-men 
cried out unconsciously in pain and in that moment experienced an 
enlightenment.
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To give another example, among the disciples of Nan-ch’iian there 
was a practicing layman named Kan-chih." When he was visited by (the 
monk) Hsiieh-fBng, he closed the gate and from behind it said, “ Please 
do come in.” It is said he was testing his visitor but when Hsiieh-fSng 
saw this, he stepped back from the fence, shook his robe and started to 
walk past the gate. At that moment, Kan-chih opened the gate and 
bowed in obeisance.
What does it mean that Hsiieh-ffcng shook his robe? As a monk’s 
robe can be the billion worlds of the Buddha’s domain, we can prob­
ably even call it the Buddha. Even Paul spoke of “ wearing Christ.” If 
we see this therefore as one or two shakes of the billion worlds of the 
Buddha, we can see this as Hsiieh-feng emitting light and shaking the 
ground (like a Buddha). Or, Hsiieh-feng may simply have shaken his 
robe to clean it from the dust that had accumulated. Kan-chih *s closing 
of the gate can also be said to be an expression of his own so-called ab­
solute self wherein he has transcended his relationship to the Buddhas 
and patriarchs. In the same way, perhaps the dust on Hsueh-feng’s 
robe represents his absolute self from the same transcendent stand­
point.
In this expression of a mutual cutting off of their relationship to tra­
dition, we have in this story what may be termed a point of perfect har­
mony where one mirror is turned to face another. This is expressed in 
Buddhism as being “ divided by millions of kalpas but not apart for 
even an instant.” Ultimately, we can see how the entire meaning of 
what I have said here is contained within the one image of the shaken 
robe of Hsueh-fSng. At least I hope it is clear that within these stories 
of the encounters between two persons of Zen can be found expres­
sions of the ultimate locale of an encounter between Person and Per­
son.
To close the door to someone who comes to “ ask” about one’s own 
home-ground is to allow an encounter between Person and Person on 
the ground where an absolute resolution of each self can take place. 
But first that ground must be opened up. In this sense the closed gate is 
actually the open gate of a most profound and final dimension. In that 
dimension it is only by means of the closed gate that the open gate is 
possible; i.e., the rejection is the sermon. Or, “ dropping one’s hands is 
the same as a cliff 10,000 fathoms high.” 0  In a sense it is a kind of ex­
perimental device used to find out the state of the visitor as Person; but
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it is also an act of compassion to suggest to him the ground to which 
he must ascend before the resolution of his self can occur. As with the 
examples above, Liang-sui’s and Yun-men’s first attempt at a visit and 
ended in failure, but on the second try they were able to reach that 
ground. In the case of the practitioner Kan-chih and Hsiieh-feng, they 
met on that ground from the beginning. On another occasion, the same 
Hsiieh-f&ng, in response to a monk who came to visit him, opened 
the gate, suddenly stuck out his face and said, “ What is this?”  This is 
the same as the closed gate incident in that he challenged his visitor to 
open the ground that must be reached to resolve the existential/existen- 
tialist gap that exists in the relationship between two people.
Occurrences like these—events in which two persons are linked 
within actual historical circumstances—form religious/existential land­
marks. Regarding these existential occurrences themselves from the 
point of view of the realized “ Dharma principle” (in a word, the 
existentialist point of view), each can be called a real dialectic (not a 
dialectic as an abstract theory but a dialectic based on an actual relation­
ship that has been embodied, as it were, in a doctrinal principle). This 
real dialectic is included in the basis of the relationship between one 
Person and another Person, both living and active in the present 
world. This can also be seen as a development of Dharma on the field 
of the so-called realm of the interpenetration of phenomena without 
obstruction p In a Zen encounter, the Dharma-wheel of the “ realm of 
truth”  (dharmadhotu) is turned. From the Zen standpoint (on the field 
of the realm of the interpenetration of phenomena without obstruc­
tion), of course, the two viewpoints of “ existential” and “ Dharma prin­
ciple”  (existentialist) are in the end one. The complexity of the encoun­
ter is, just as it is, the living development of Dharma. Looking at it 
from this point of view, as in the example of the encounter between the 
monk and Hsueh-f€ng, the totality of the impact can be said to be the 
action of Hsueh-fSng turning the Dharma-wheel standing on the stand­
point of absolute self; this can be termed his Great Activity*
To sum up, what is opened up in a Zen encounter is a place which in 
every way serves as the ultimate locale for a meeting between people. 
When two Persons who have each returned to their own original source 
meet, no matter when this takes place, it is on such a ground; this will 
never change. In Buddhist doctrine this is called “ a place of only Bud­
dhas and Buddhas.”  The phrase in Christianity, communio sanctorum
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(the interchange of saints) probably corresponds to the same thing. To 
what extent does the complete form born from this kind of encounter 
manifest in this place? At the very least we can say that this someting 
that occurs only between Buddhas [and Buddhas], is transformed in 
Zen, without any loss of its total profundity, quietude and intensity, 
into an encounter between Person and Person. This goes one step be­
yond the original source of “ a place of only Buddhas and Buddhas,” 
to a simultaneous realization of the living present. It is on this basis 
that both the “ event”  and “ Dharma principle”  included therein tran­
scend the distinctions among religions, transcend the differences be­
tween faith and doctrine, and become a matter related to every possible 
Person.
Translated by Mark L. Blum
TRANSLATOR’S NOTES
• In East Asian Buddhism, anjin represents the religious ideal of a mind 
without anxiety, or in a strictly doctrinal sense, without duhkha. Much more than the 
absence o f  worry implied by the phrase, “ peace o f mind,”  anjin is used in Buddhism 
as a technical term to indicate spiritual attainment reached after treading a rigorous 
path o f  inquiry. Unlike the modern Japanese word anshin written with the same 
Chinese characters which expresses an affective state o f  repose, anjin denotes the 
spiritual. Although the word has resonance in all schools o f  Buddhism, it appears in 
early Chan writings including the manuscripts found at Tun-huang such as theAn-Asirr 
fa-m en  (J . Anjin hOmon) attributed to Bodhidharma, the Leng-chia shih-tzu
ch i(J . Ryoga shyi ron) as well as the influential Ching-te ch ’uan-teng lu ( J.
Keitoku dentO roku) from the early Sung, etc. It is also well known for its
usage in Pure Land, where aryin (a synonym for shinjin in JOdo ShinshO), is found in 
the basic writings o f T ’an-luan, Tao-ch’o, Shan-tao, HOnen, Shinran, Rennyo, etc. In 
both Zen and Pure Land writings, anjin indicates a final state o f  assurance within the 
individual wherein the most critical questions o f  one’s relationship to the sacred have 
been resolved.
b Alaya-vyftdna. Usually rendered as “ storehouse consciousness,” the Alaya  is in­
troduced in the YogAcAra tradition o f MahAyAna Buddhism as the eighth level o f  con­
sciousnesses. The first six consciousnesses correspond to the perceptual apparatus of 
the five senses plus that o f  thinking. The seventh consciousness, called rnanas, is the 
locale o f  the origins o f both the specific defilements (kiesa) o f  thought, speech and ac-
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tion as well as the false notion of a permanent self. Unlike the manas level which can be 
made the conscious object o f thought, the Alaya cannot be recognized as such and 
despite different notions o f its functioning, roughly corresponds to Western notions of 
an “unconscious.”
c Great Doubt. A  term coined by Zen master Hakuin (1685-1768) to refer to a state 
of mind completely overwhelmed by existential uncertainty regarding the validity of 
the self and the world, including one’s religious orientation. For Hakuin passing 
through this stage is crucial to the attainment of the liberation, and he is famous for 
proclaiming that the depth of one’s doubt determines the depth of one’s enlighten­
ment.
a Shobogenzo “ ShOji” [Sams&ra]. See Eastern Buddhist 5-1 (1972) for a translation 
by Norman Waddell and Abe Masao, who also add a note regarding the fact that this 
passage has been traditionally interpreted as reflecting DOgen’s affinity to Pure Land 
Buddhism.
* There are three “ bodies” of the Buddha in Mahayana, the transformation-body 
(nirmanaktlya), enjoyment-body (sambhogakdya) and dharma-body (dhormakayd). In 
contrast to the transformation-body representing the Buddha manifest in history, the 
enjoyment-body is a vision available only to those who can reach advanced meditation 
states. The dharmakOya is conceived as a formless representation of Truth unable to be 
perceived until it manifests in one of the other two bodies.
z  The word Sahgha traditionally refers to the Buddhist monastic community. As one 
of the so-called three treasures of Buddhism in addition to the founder and his teach­
ings, the concept of professional religious community here appears to represent for 
Nishitani the weight of precedent in Buddhist practice and attainment.
1 Divided fo r  millions o f years . . . .  This phrase is traced to the Japanese Zen 
master, DaitO Kokushi (also called SChO MyOchO), who lived from 1282-1338. It was 
also a favorite quotation of Nishida KitarO (1870-1945), Nishitani’s mentor, who 
refers to it several times in his final treatise, Basho-teki ronri to shakyO-teki sekaikan 
(1945; nkz 11:371-468; for a translation, see Michiko Yusa, trans., “ The Logic of 
Topos and the Religious Worldview,” in Eastern Buddhist 19-2 11986] and 20-1 
[1987]: 81-119). To Nishida it well expressed the paradoxical logic of his so-called 
logic o f place, of which he writes: “ Eternal life is found in the identity o f samsOra and 
nirvana. The relationship between our self and God, the absolute, is best expressed 
by DaitO Kokushi’s words which I often quote” (nkz 11:420; Yusa trans., 11:87).
* The four shouts and the four outlooks. Two expressions from the Lin-chi Hi (J. 
Rinzai-roku) used in the Rinzai Zen school. The first, ssu-ho (J. shikatsu), refers 
to the four different ways Lin-chi would shout in response to his students’ questions, 
depending on the student and the question. The shout has been understood as his way 
of trying to dispel doubt among them. The second, ssu-liao chien Q tttt (J. shi- 
ryokeri), denotes four categories o f judging the nature of the self and world: the sub­
ject is subsumed in the object of perception , the object is subsumed in the subject, 
both subject and object have been subsumed and do not exist, neither subject nor ob­
ject have been subsumed and both exist.
1 Ku-yin Yiin-ts’ung (J. Kokuin UnsO; also pronounced Yu-yin Yun-
ts’ung); his dates are 965-1032. Shih-t’ou Hsi-ch’ien ESMMil (J. SekitO Risen) lived
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from 700 to 790 and was a student o f  Ch’ing-yuan Hsing-ssu W fffjB , a direct disciple 
o f  the Sixth Patriarch, Hui-neng.
y The term sa fa r i  9 is here being rendered in the sense o f  bandha, thus one has 
no binds, fetters, attachments to samsdra.
* This encounter occurred sometime in the T’ang dynasty, but there are no known 
dates for the life o f  either Liang-sui Ma-ku They are thought to be in the 
Ma-tsu line. Ma-ku is actually the name o f a mountain in Shanshi province taken as 
the sobriquet for the monk Pao-ch’8.
1 The expression is actually “ dead grass,” which in Zen refers to someone in terrible 
straits—i.e., feeling as low and worthless as cut grass.
m Yiin-men Wen-yen (864 to 949) lived during the period o f  decline and
eventual collapse o f  the T’ang empire. This is a paraphrase o f  a story that can be found 
in the commentary to case six in the P i yen lu (Hekiganroku), translated as The Blue 
Cliff Record by Thomas and J. C. Cleary, pp. 37-38. See also Urs App, M aster Yun- 
men (New York: Kodansha, 1994), pp. 19 and 220 for two other versions o f  this story. 
The teacher in the story is Yiin-men’s first Chan teacher, known by various names 
including Mu-chou Tao-tsung Mu-chou Tao-ming, Reverend Ch’en, etc.
" Nan-ch’uan P ’u-ytian a disciple o f  Ma-tsu, lived from 748 to 835. The
dates o f  layman Kan-chih are unknown, but the dates o f  the monk Hsiieh-feng 
I-ts’un are 822-908.
0 dropping one’s  hands. In this context, dropping one’s hands refers to a monk 
departing from the prescribed deportment in which the hands are always held up 
against the solar plexus when walking. Thus letting them fall signified taking a more 
natural approach in open defiance o f  the precepts. According to Morohashi 3.169a, in 
the Ming Period, dropping one’s hands for laymen became an expression o f  respect in 
contrast to this posture previously indicating arrogance.
p  The realm o f  the interpenetration. . . . ju'i-muge. A term from the Hua-
yen tradition which refers to the highest stage o f  realization, beyond the relationship be­
tween principle and phenomenon in which phenomena are mutually and equally con­
nected in and o f themselves, and not through the mediation o f  any law or principle.
q Great A ctivity  zAJRXffl (daiki daiyQ) refers to the spiritually exalted work o f a per­
son o f  Zen.
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